A co-evolutionary approach to the tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets: Piecewise linear bidding structure case

2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003 - Proceedings

Volumn 4, Issue , 2003, Pages 2306-2313

  Cau, T D H ^a   Anderson, E J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COSTS; ELECTRICITY; GENETIC ALGORITHMS; PIECEWISE LINEAR TECHNIQUES;

CO-EVOLUTIONARY; CO-EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH; ELECTRICITY MARKET; MARKET ENVIRONMENT; OLIGOPOLISTIC ELECTRICITY MARKETS; PIECEWISE LINEAR; SIMPLE MODELING; WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS;

ELECTRIC GENERATORS;

EID: 84901441991     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2003.1299376     Document Type: Conference Paper

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