Re-measuring agency costs: The effectiveness of blockholders

Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 47, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 588-601

 

^a Cindy)   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs of equity; Blockholders; Contracting market; Managerial extravagance; Underinvestment

Indexed keywords

EID: 36248932745     PISSN: 10629769     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2007.09.003     Document Type: Article

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