Doping and cheating in contest-like situations

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 988-1006

  Kräkel, Matthias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cheating; Contest; Doping; Fraud in research; Tournament

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048981512     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.003     Document Type: Article

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