On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports

Journal of Sports Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 61-89

  Maennig, Wolfgang ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84990330523     PISSN: 15270025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1527002502003001005     Document Type: Article

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