Fiscal centralization and the form of corruption in China

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1001-1009

  Chen, Kang ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

China; Corruption; Fiscal federalism; Grabbing hand; Helping hand; Transition

Indexed keywords

EID: 4844231437     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.12.003     Document Type: Article

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