Testing the "Dick Cheney" hypothesis: Do governments of the left attract more terrorism than governments of the right?

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 311-326

  Koch, Michael T ^a   Cranmer, Skyler ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648994411     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940701643672     Document Type: Article

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