Corruption and auctions

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 97-108

  Menezes, Flavio M ^a   Monteiro, Paulo Klinger ^b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Auctions; Corruption; Efficiency

Indexed keywords

EID: 32044457545     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.04.002     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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