Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 437-452

  Waehrer, Keith ^a  

^a BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Bidding; D44; L40; Mergers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033479683     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00043-x     Document Type: Article

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