Bidding into the red: A model of post-auction bankruptcy

Journal of Finance

Volumn 62, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 2695-2723

  Board, Simon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34848834910     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01290.x     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Athey, Susan, 2001, Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information, Econometrica 69, 861 889.
2. Board, Simon, 2005, Bidding into the red: Web appendix, Working paper, University of Toronto, http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/board/papers/bankrupt- webappendix.pdf.
3. Bulow, Jeremy, Ming Huang, and Paul Klemperer, 1999, Toeholds and takeovers, Journal of Political Economy 107, 427 454.
4. Bulow, Jeremy, and John Roberts, 1989, The simple economics of optimal auctions, Journal of Political Economy 97, 1060 1090.
5. Burkart, Mike, 1995, Initial shareholdings and overbidding in takeover contests, Journal of Finance 50, 1491 1515.
6. Cramton, Peter, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer, 1987, Dissolving a partnership efficiently, Econometrica 55, 615 632.
7. DeMarzo, Peter, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005, Bidding with securities - auctions and security design, American Economic Review 95, 936 959.
8. Goeree, Jacob K., Emiel Maasland, Sander Onderstal, and John L. Turner, 2005, How (not) to raise money, Journal of Political Economy 113, 897 918.
9. Grimm, Veronkia, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter, 2002, The third generation (utms) spectrum auction in Germany, ifo Studien 48, 123 143.
10. Hansen, Robert G., and John R. Lott, 1991, The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions: Comment, American Economic Review 81, 347 361.
11. Hart, Oliver, and John Moore, 1994, A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 841 879.
12. Hart, Oliver, and John Moore, 1998, Default and renegotiation: A dynamic model of debt, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 1 41.
13. Klemperer, Paul, 2004, Auctions: Theory and Practice (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey).
14. Maskin, Eric, and John Riley, 1984, Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers, Econometrica 52, 1473 1518.
15. Mattey, Joe P., 1990, The Timber Bubble that Burst: Government Policy and the Bailout of 1984 (Oxford University Press, New York).
16. Matthews, Steven A., 1987, Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: A buyer's point of view, Econometrica 55, 633 646.
17. Milgrom, Paul, and Ilya Segal, 2002, Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets, Econometrica 70, 583 601.
18. Milgrom, Paul, and Robert Weber, 2000, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding - part ii, in Paul Klemperer, ed The Economic Theory of Auctions, Vol. II (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 179 194.
19. Myerson, Roger, 1981, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 58 73.
20. Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and S. Viswanathan, 2000, Corporate reorganizations and non-cash auctions, Journal of Finance 55, 1807 1849.
21. Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and S. Viswanathan, 2005, Financing auction bids, RAND Journal of Economics 36, 789 815.
22. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1992, Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium approach, Journal of Finance 47, 1343 1366.
23. Waehrer, Keith, 1995, A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages, Journal of Economic Theory 67, 531 555.
24. White, Michelle J., 1989, The corporate bankruptcy decision, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 129 151.
25. Zheng, Charles, 2001, High bids and broke winners, Journal of Economic Theory 100, 129 171.