Financing auction bids

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 789-815

  Rhodes Kropf, Matthew ^a   Viswanathan, S ^b  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744777137     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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