Dividends, corporate monitors and agency costs

Financial Review

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 37-65

  Borokhovich, Kenneth A ^a   Brunarski, Kelly R ^b   Harman, Yvette ^b   Kehr, James B ^b  

^a CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Corporate governance; Corporate monitoring; Dividend policy; G32; G35

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548845613     PISSN: 07328516     EISSN: 15406288     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0732-8516.2005.00092.x     Document Type: Article

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