Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 67-85

  Salmon, Timothy C ^a   Iachini, Michael ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Charles Schwab & Co Inc   (United States)

Author keywords

Ascending auctions; Loss aversion; Multiple unit auctions; Private values; Sealed bid auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548454839     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.12.004     Document Type: Article

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