Spectrum auctions by the United States federal communications commission

Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 147-176

  Salmon, Timothy C ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548388109     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610844.008     Document Type: Chapter

References (27)

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