Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 79-106

  Serrano, Roberto ^a   Volij, Oscar ^a,b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242516321     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2680     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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