Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 33-68

  Ishikida, Takashi ^a   Marschak, Thomas ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication costs; Decentralized mechanisms; Exchange economies; Message spaces

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745172318     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf02499124     Document Type: Article

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