The optimal use of fines and imprisonment if governments do not maximize welfare

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 677-695

  Dittmann, Ingolf ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548041705     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00283.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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