Judicial review by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts: Explaining justices' responses to constitutional challenges

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 71-90

  Lindquist, Stefanie A ^a   Solberg, Rorie Spill ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutional challenges; Federalism; Judicial review; U.S. Supreme Court

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547842648     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1065912906298579     Document Type: Article

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