Policy myopia and economic growth

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 734-753

  Aidt, Toke S ^a   Dutta, Jayasri ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Electoral accountability; Growth; Myopia; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547665182     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.05.002     Document Type: Article

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