Amenities and pitfalls of a reputational theory of compliance with international law

Nordic Journal of International Law

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 39-71

  Burgstaller, Markus ^a  

^a Federal Chancellery of Austria   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547630490     PISSN: 09027351     EISSN: 15718107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/090273507X181656     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. This article is broadly based on a monograph published by the author. See M. Burgstaller, Theories of Compliance with International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005). For a review of this book,
2. see D. Pulkowski, 'Testing Compliance Theories', 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006) pp. 511-554.
3. See Financial Times, 20-21 May 2006, p. 3.
4. See also The Economist, 13 May 2006, p. 49 (quoting Mr. Bellinger as to have insisted on the US's "absolute commitment to upholding our national and international obligations to eradicate torture and prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment anywhere").
5. N. Krisch, 'International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order', 16 European Journal of International Law (2005) pp. 369-408 (analysing the multiple ways in which dominant states interact with international law).
6. See also S. H. Cleveland, 'Our International Constitution', 31 Yale Journal of International Law (2006) pp. 1-125 (arguing that international law has been a part of United States constitutional interpretation from the beginning and a principled resort to international law is fully part of the American tradition).
7. Cf. A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 212-213.
8. T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990) pp. 14-16.
9. N. Macchiavelli (trans. W. K. Marriott), The Prince (Knopf Publishing, New York, 1981) p. 78.
10. See generally e.g. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986);
11. J. Habermas (trans. T. McCardiy), Communication and the Evolution of Society (Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1970).
12. L. Henkin, How Nations Behave (Columbia University Press, New York, 2nd ed., 1979) p. 47.
13. The United Nations Treaty Series currendy contains over 150,000 treaties. United Nations Treaty Series Overview (2006), 〈untreaty.un.org/ English/overview.asp〉.
14. See e.g. the summary provided by O. Yasuaki, 'International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society', 14 European Journal of International Law (2003) p. 105.
15. J. Alvarez, 'Foreword: Why Nations Behave', 19 Michigan Journal of International Law (1998) pp. 308-310.
16. I have given an overview of various dieories of compliance with international law in Burgstaller, supra note 1, pp. 103-190.
17. See e.g. O. A. Hathaway, 'The Cost of Commitment', 55 Stanford Law Review (2003) p. 1821 (arguing that scholars have almost entirely ignored the questions of why treaties come into being and what motivates nations to join them). But,
18. see also O. A. Hathaway, 'Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law', 71 University of Chicago Law Review (2005) pp. 473-474 (arguing that we find that compliance not only depends upon the decision to commit, but commitment also depends upon the decision to comply).
19. Cf. e.g. A. T. Guzman, 'The Design of International Agreements', 16 European Journal of International Law (2005) pp. 579-612 (explaining why rational states sometimes prefer to draft their agreements in such a way as to make them less credible and therefore more easily violated; arguing further that parties, when deciding which design elements to include, must balance the benefits of increased compliance against the costs triggered in the event of a violation; hereinafter 'Design');
20. A. T. Guzman, 'The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms', 31 Journal of Legal Studies (2002) pp. 303-326 (explaining why the use of mandatory dispute resolution is the exception rather than the rule in international agreements; hereinafter 'Cost of Credibility').
21. A. T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law", 90 California Law Review (2002) p. 1823;
22. J. K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law', 37 Harvard International Law Journal (1996) p. 156. I will also mostly forego a discussion of the-increasingly somewhat blurred-differentiation between various forms of 'legalisation' of international relations.
23. See, amongst many, K. W Abbott and D. Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance', 54 International Organization (2000) pp. 421-456;
24. M. Kahler, 'Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization', 54 International Organization (2000) pp. 661-683;
25. D. Shelton, 'Law, Non-Law and the Problem of Soft Law, in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International. Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) pp. 7-23 (hereinafter 'Commitment and Compliance');
26. D. H. Ho, 'Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?', 5 Journal of International Economic Law (2002) pp. 647-688;
27. K Raustiala, 'Form and Substance in International Agreements', 99 American Journal of International Law (2005) pp. 581-614 (arguing that widespread preference for contracts often unduly weakens the substance and structure of multilateral agreements when states are uncertain about compliance costs). Unless otherwise addressed, I will concentrate on compliance with international treaty law.
28. "A successful answer to the question of why people obey laws reveals nothing about whether or why they are obliged to do so." E. M. Peñalver, 'The Persistent Problem of Obligation in International Law', 36 Stanford Journal of International Law (2000) p. 274.