Testing Compliance Theories: Towards US Obedience of International Law in the Avena Case

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 511-554

  Pulkowski, Dirk ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

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EID: 85010086220     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156506003426     Document Type: Review

References (181)

1. Avena and otherMexican Nationals (Mexico v. US), Judgment, [2004] ICJ Rep. 59, at Dispositif, para. 9.
2. The right to be informed is enshrined in Art. 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which both the United States andMexico are parties.
3. W. M. Reisman, ‘International Incidents” Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law’, in W. M. Reisman and A. R.Willard (eds.), International Incidents” The Law that Counts inWorld Politics (1988), 5.
4. Question by a journalist, State Department daily press briefing for 31 March 2004 with Adam Ereli, deputy spokesman, transcript.
5. Statement by Kent Cattani, chief counsel in the capital-litigation section of the Arizona Attorney General's Office, quoted in M. Scheffer, ‘Mexicans on US Death RowsWere Denied Rights, UN Says’, Arizona Republic, 1 April 2004.
6. Quoted in ‘A Court Spurned’, Albany Times Union, 7 April 2004.
7. Available at http//www.asil.org/inthenews/avenamemo050308.html.
8. Report of the United States Delegation to the Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, reprinted in Sen. Exec. E. 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,May 8, 1969, at 41 et seq.
9. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1979] ICJ Rep. 7.
10. Available at the website of the UN Treaty Collection, http//untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIII/treaty33.asp.
11. Whether the withdrawal was legally effective, however, is open to scholarly dispute; cf.W. M. Reisman and M.H.Arsanjani, ‘NoExit?A Preliminary Examination of the Legal Consequences of United States’ Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’, forthcoming (manuscript on file with the author).
12. H. H. Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law’, (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599.
13. ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law’., at 2600.
14. M. Koskenniemi, ‘Hierarchy in International Law” A Sketch’, (1997) 8 EJIL 566, at 568.
15. ‘Hierarchy in International Law” A Sketch’., at 569.
16. L. Henkin, How Nations Behave (1979), 47.
17. A. T. Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’, (2002) 90 California Law Review 1823, at 1826.
18. O. A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights TreatiesMake a Difference?’, (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935.
19. For other possible distinctions see B. Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law’, (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 345.
20. Henkin, ‘Do Human Rights TreatiesMake a Difference?’ note 16, at 49.
21. D. Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue” Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2004).
22. Cf. K. W. Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory” A Prospectus for International Lawyers’, (1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law 335; J. L. Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman, ‘Economic Analysis of International Law’, (1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 1; Guzman, ‘Do Human Rights TreatiesMake a Difference?’ note 17.
23. None of the players knows when the last game occurs.
24. Art. 60(2)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, while not mentioning the term ‘integral obligations’, provides for a right to suspend the operation of a treaty obligation in case ‘the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty’. Cf. also Art. 42(b)(ii) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, granting a non-injured state the right to invoke state responsibility when the obligation breached is ‘of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other states to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation’. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) 58.
25. The process of defining preferences is exogenous to rational-choice theories.
26. P. B. Stephan, ‘Accountability and International Lawmaking” Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, (1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 681.
27. Kingsbury, ‘Accountability and International Lawmaking” Rules note 19, at 349.
28. A. C. Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (1999).
29. A.Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999), 217.
30. Social Theory of International Politics.
31. Social Theory of International Politics., at 73.
32. Cf. A. Clark Arend, ‘Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics’, (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 107, at 128.
33. The precise definition of the concept of identity (dependent or independent variable?) is controversial. Cf. for a useful overview,M.Horowitz, ‘Research Report on theUse of Identity Concepts in International Relations’, available at http//www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/publications/horowitz1.pdf.
34. In the Chayeses’ view, ‘compliance is the normal organizational assumption’. A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, (1993) 47 International Organization 175, at 179.
35. For a survey of the literature, see Hirsch, The Impact of International Lawon InternationalCooperation” Theoretical Perspectives, 182-3.
36. Thus the apt characterization by Kingsbury, ‘compliance is the normal organizational assumption’. note 19, at 357.
37. A.-M. Slaughter, ‘International Law in aWorld of Liberal states’, (1995) 6 EJIL 503, at 537.
38. For a critique of this contention, see J. E. Alvarez, ‘Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory’, (2001) 12 EJIL 183; see also A. M. Kakcowicz, ‘Compliance and Non-Compliance with International Norms in Territorial Disputes” The Latin American Record of Arbitrators’, in The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation” Theoretical Perspectives, at 214, noting that ‘the Latin American region has proven that non-democratic states can share some, if not all, of the normative perspectives and institutional restraints that seem to characterize democracies’.
39. Arend, ‘International Law in aWorld of Liberal states’ note 29, at 139.
40. See for this characterization of the effectiveness of courts, Reisman, ‘International Law in aWorld of Liberal states’ note 3, at 7.
41. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945), 144.
42. N.Machiavelli, The Prince (1515), ch. XII, available at http//www.constitution.org/mac/prince12.htm.
43. According to Art. 50(1)(a) of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, ‘Countermeasures shall not affect”… [t]he obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) 58.
44. UNCIO 831, at 833 et seq. For an overview of other far-reaching proposals of multilateral enforcement of decisions by the International Court of Justice at the San Francisco Founding Conference, see Schulte, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice.
45. Art. 94 of the UN Charter charges the Security Council, at its discretion, with a limited role in enforcing decisions by the International Court of Justice.
46. W. M. Reisman, ‘The Enforcement of International Judgments’, (1969) 63 AJIL 1, at 7 (footnote omitted).
47. ‘The Enforcement of International Judgments’.
48. For countermeasures to enforce human rights see the cases compiled in the ILC commentary on Art. 54 of theDraft Articles on State Responsibility, ‘The Enforcement of International Judgments’. note 24, at 351 et seq., and the cases compiled by K.Weschke, Internationale Instrumente zur Durchsetzung derMenschenrechte (2001), 98 et seq.
49. H.Neuhold, ‘The Foreign-Policy “Cost-BenefitAnalysis” Revisited’, (1999) 42 German Yearbook of International Law 84, at 95.
50. See also the discussion in J. Crawford, Third Report, A/CN.4/507, Add.4, 16 and 18, who concedes that there is ‘a due process issue’ from the perspective of the targeted state if a few powerful states decide to act as a kind of human rights police for the world, based on their auto-interpretation of human rights law; see M. Koskenniemi, ‘Solidarity Measures” State Responsibility as a New International Order?’, (2001) 72 BYIL 337, at 347. C. Tomuschat, by contrast, has argued that the regime of countermeasures ‘does not place new states in a position of inferiority’. Indeed, from a formal legal perspective, countermeasures could constitute an effective shield inthehandof developing countries-the freezing of assets or the suspension of intellectual property rights are probably the most effective tools that cometomind. C.Tomuschat, ‘Are Countermeasures Subject to Prior Recourse to Dispute Settlement Procedures?’, (1994) 5 EJIL 77, at 78. However, Tomuschat neglects the political costs of countermeasures.
51. Neuhold, For countermeasures to enforce human rights see the cases compiled in the ILC commentary on Art. note 51, at 92.
52. Neuhold, For countermeasures to enforce human rights see the cases compiled in the ILC commentary on Art. note 51, at 97.
53. For countermeasures to enforce human rights see the cases compiled in the ILC commentary on Art., at 98.
54. For countermeasures to enforce human rights see the cases compiled in the ILC commentary on Art., at 105.
55. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, Award, 17 July 2003, (2003) 42 ILM 788; Azurix Corporation v. The Republic or Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 Dec. 2003, (2004) 43 ILM 262.
56. See for a more technical definition in terms of game theory G. W. Downs and M. A. Jones, ‘Reputation, Compliance, and International Law’, (2002) 31 Journal of LegalStudies 95, at 98” ‘a player's reputation is viewed here as a summary of its opponent's current beliefs about the player's compliance strategy or set of strategies in connection with various commitments’.
57. A. T. Guzman, ‘The Design of International Agreements’, (2005) 16 EJIL 579, at 595.
58. R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony” Cooperation and Discord in theWorld Political Economy (1984), at 106.
59. Guzman, ‘The Design of International Agreements’ note 17, at 1861.
60. Suchas in theWTOcontext,wheremuchof thesubstantial obligationsassumedarecontainedinindividually negotiated, member-specific schedules and annexes.
61. The accession of Greece and Spainmay be cited as examples. Both countries had just overcome a dictatorial past and were nascent-unreputed-democracies. EC membership had an immensely stabilizing effect. Similar considerations may have led to the accession of several former Soviet republics to NATO.
62. Downs and Jones, The accession of Greece and Spainmay be cited as examples. note 59, at 109.
63. By contrast, it should be recalled that constructivist international relations theory-as opposed to liberal institutionalism-takes the state as the relevant actor. Hence its proponents claim that the state's preferences are socially constructed by socialization in the international society.
64. Moravcsik, By contrast, it should be recalled that constructivist international relations theory-as opposed to liberal institutionalism-takes the state as the relevant actor. note 39, at 526-7.
65. See the report available at http//www.eubusiness.com/afp/031124173342.qe9cs5uw.
66. United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 10 Nov. 2003, WT/DS248/AB/R.
67. T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), 7.
68. T. M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990).
69. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations., at 92 et seq.
70. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations., at 184 (emphasis in original).
71. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. note 73, at 49.
72. J. Brunné e and S. J. Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism” Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law’, (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19, at 51-2.
73. F. R. Teso’ n, A Philosophy of International Law (1998), 91.
74. Teso’ n's reading of the ‘Kantian thesis’ is contentious. P. Capps has advanced a reading of Kant'sMetaphsik der Sitten (Metaphysics of Morals) which is quite contrary to Teso’ n's” P. Capp, ‘The Kantian Project in Modern International Legal Theory’, (2001) 12 EJIL 1003.
75. Teso’ n, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. note 78, at 95 (emphasis added).
76. J. Habermas, Faktizitä t und Geltung” Beiträ ge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (1992), 48.
77. Hirsch, in The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation” Theoretical Perspectives, at 188-9.
78. For a survey of the literature, see The Power of Legitimacy among Nations., at 182-3.
79. Koh, For a survey of the literature note 12, at 2646.
80. H. H. Koh, ‘Transnational Public Law Litigation’, (1990) 100 Yale Law Journal 2347.
81. W. J. Aceves, ‘Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship” The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation’, (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 129, at 134.
82. Or, in Koh's terms, the ‘“transmission belt”, whereby norms created by international society infiltrate into domestic society’, Koh, ‘Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship” The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation’ note 12, at 2651.
83. J. E. Alvarez, ‘Measuring Compliance’, (2002) 96 ASIL Proceedings 210, at 211-12.
84. Koh, ‘Measuring Compliance’ note 12, at 2648.
85. A device that A.-M. Slaughter calls ‘vertical networks’, A.-M. Slaughter,ANewWorldOrder (2004), 144 et seq.
86. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations” The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001), 485.
87. A device that A.-M. Slaughter calls ‘vertical networks’., at 486. Cf. also n. 276 on the same page for amore detailed explanation.
88. L. Pospisil classically defined law as decisions made with authority; intended to have universal application; provided with physical or psychological sanctions, entitling one party and obligating the other party, ‘Legal Levels andMultiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies’, (1967) 11 Conflict Resolution 2, at 8-9.
89. Cf. R. Rouland, Legal Anthropology, trans. P. G. Planel (1988), 255.
90. A. Carty, ‘Critical International Law” Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law’, (1991) 2 EJIL 66, at 68.
91. Reisman, ‘Critical International Law” Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law’ note 3, at 15. In International Incidents the authors propose to study international lawmaking (and the change of the content of legal prescriptions) by examining certain critical events rather than attempting to distil from the ‘flow’ of day-to-day politics a virtually uniform state practice.
92. The list is based on the accounts of A. R.Willard, in Reisman andWillard, ‘Critical International Law” Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law’ note 3, 25 at 26, and H. D. Lasswell and M. S.McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, Volume I (1992), 141-66.
93. R. A. Falk, ‘Casting the Spell” The New Haven School of International Law’, (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1991, at 2002.
94. M. Simons and T.Weiner, ‘World Court Orders US Death Row Review’, Globe andMail, 1 April 2004.
95. ‘World Court Sides withMexico on DisputewithUS overDeath Penalty’, SourceMex EconomicNews& Analysis onMexico, 14 April 2004.
96. ‘World Court Sides withMexico on DisputewithUS overDeath Penalty’.
97. M. Simons and T.Weiner, ‘World Court RulesUS Should Review 51Death Sentences’,NewYork Times, 1 April 2004.
98. ‘World Court Sides withMexico’, ‘World Court RulesUS Should Review 51Death Sentences’ note 100.
99. Cf. the press statements by the Foreign Ministry of 25 February 1999, 2 March 1999 (two press statements), and 4March 1999.
100. ‘Amerika im Fall LaGrand verurteilt” Internationaler Gerichtshof stellt Verstoß gegen das Vö lkerrecht fest’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 June 2001.
101. C. J.Williams, ‘World Court Rebukes US for Arizona Executions’, Arizona Republic, 28 June 2001.
102. ‘Die Bundesregierung hatte wiederholt betont, wie schwer es ihr fä llt, ein Verfahren gegen einen ihrer engsten Verbü ndeten fü hren zu mü ssen, mit dem uns Geschichte, eine gemeinsame Werteordnung und ein dichtes Netz enger Beziehungen auf allen Ebenen verbindet. Uns kam es vielmehr darauf an, anhand dieses exemplarischen Falls eine Reihe wichtiger Rechtsfragen durch das Hauptrechtsprechungsorgan der Vereinten Nationen klä ren zu lassen, die fü r die gesamte Staatengemeinschaft von großer Bedeutung sein werden. Die Freundschaft mit den USA war dabei eine wichtige Voraussetzung, die sicherstellte, dass das Verfahren zu jedem Zeitpunkt von Fairness und dem gemeinsamen Respekt vor derHerrschaft des Rechts in den internationalen Beziehungen geprä gt war’. Quoted in A. Fischer-Lescano, ‘Vö lkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Jahren 2000 bis 2002’, (2004) 94 Zaö RV 195, at 221.
103. ‘World Court Rebukes US for Arizona Executions’.
104. ‘World Court Rebukes US for Arizona Executions’.
105. ‘World Court Sides withMexico’, ‘World Court Rebukes US for Arizona Executions’. note 100.
106. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of the UnitedMexican States, 9 January 2003, at para. 20.
107. ‘World Court Sides withMexico’, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals note 100.
108. Slaughter, ‘World Court Sides withMexico’ note 90, at 3.
109. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser. A), No. 16, 1 Oct. 1999, para. 26.
110. Cf. infra, section 3.1.3, ‘Domestic litigation’.
111. Application of the Republic of Paraguay, 3 April 1998, para. 25, available at http//www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ idocket/ipaus/ipausorder/ipaus_iapplication_980403.html.
112. Statement by the co-agent and counsel of Germany, Professor B. Simma, Verbatim record of the public sitting, Monday, 13 Nov. 2000, at 3 p.m., para. 29, available at http//www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-27.html
113. Avena, Judgment, ‘Domestic litigation’. note 1, para. 124.
114. See on this point the insightful discussion in B. Simma and C.Hoppe, ‘FromLaGrand and Avena toMedelle’ n-A Rocky Road Toward Implementation’, (2006) 14 Tulane Journal of International Comparative Law 1, at 6.
115. Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty’, 9March 2005, UN Doc. E/2005/3.
116. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998).
117. This has been particularly true since the President's Memorandum, cf. for example the following contributions in publications for criminal defenders” M. Donald, ‘Stuck in Habeas Hell” Bush Breathes New Life into Texas Death-Row Inmate's Case’, (2005) 21 Texas Lawyer, 2 May 2005; M. Donald, ‘Habeas Hope” President and World Court Breathe New Life into Death-Row Inmate's Case’, (2005) 21 Texas Lawyer, 9 May 2005; M. A. Robbins, ‘On Tap at the CCA’, (2005) 21 Texas Lawyer, 29 Aug. 2005;M. Donald, ‘Medelle’ n Returns” CCA Considers Bush'sMemo to Override Its Own Procedural Rules’, (2005) 21 Texas Lawyer, 19 Sept. 2005.
118. For a discussion of the decisions of US courts from a international law perspective, see Simma and Hoppe, This has been particularly true since the President's Memorandum note 120, at 20 et seq.
119. LaGrand, Judgment, [2001] ICJ Rep. 104, para. 77.
120. United States v. Banaban, 85 Fed. Appx. 395 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F. 3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001); Gordon v. State, 863 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); State v.Navarro, 659N.W.2d 487, at 490-1(Wisc.Ct.App. 2003); Rodriguez v. State, 837 So.2d 478 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2002); State v.Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267 (N.M. 2001); Commonwealth v.Malvo, 2003 WL 21033418 (Va.Cir.Ct. 6May 2003).
121. LaGrand, For a discussion of the decisions of US courts from a international law perspective note 126, para. 91.
122. Osbaldo Torres v. State of Oklahoma, 43 ILM 1227 (2004).
123. For a discussion of the decisions of US courts from a international law perspective., at 1229 (footnotes omitted).
124. Medelle’ n v. Dretke, 371 F. 3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), at 280.
125. Avena, For a discussion of the decisions of US courts from a international law perspective. note 1, para. 151.
126. Simma and Hoppe, For a discussion of the decisions of US courts from a international law perspective. note 120; C. J. Le Mon, ‘Post-Avena Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by United States Courts’, (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 215, at 227.
127. The recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir.(Ill.), 27 Sept. 2005, suggests that some US courts are indeed willing to adopt a broader interpretation of Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention. In Judge Wood's view, the Vienna Convention is ‘self-executing’ and Art. 36 confers ‘individual rights’. However, the case is different from the cases just mentioned, since Jogi had already completed his prison term and was deported to India.Hence the only remedy remaining for Jogi was damages, which he attempted to recover under the Alien Torts Statute.
128. For a discussion of the decisions of US courts from a international law perspective.
129. M. Donald, ‘Medelle’ n Returns’, For a discussion of the decisions of US courts from a international law perspective. note 124.
130. Bustillo V. Johnson, No. 05-51.
131. Llamas V. Oregon, No. 04-10566.
132. Available at http//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=198& scid=31.
133. M. Warren, ‘Representing Foreign Nationals Facing the Death Penalty” A Resource Guide’, available at http//www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/penalty.htm#Litigating%20VCCR%20Claims.
134. ‘Representing Foreign Nationals Facing the Death Penalty” A Resource Guide’., section ‘Litigating VCCR Claims’.
135. Amici include Amnesty International, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales, Center for Justice& Accountability, Global Rights, Hispanic National Bar Association, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, International League of Human Rights, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, League of United Latin American Citizens, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund,Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, and the Washington Office on Latin America.
136. By contrast, one regional paperhas pointed out that ‘ClearlyUS officials don't see this for what it is-onemore assault on capital punishment, and, by implication, the justice system in one of the fewWestern nations that still resorts to it’. ‘A Court Spurned’, Albany Times Union, 7 April 2004.
137. The search was conducted through the ‘ALLNEWS’ database of Westlaw. Of course, the mere fact that a newspaper decides to report on-or even dedicate an op-ed to-the ICJ's decision implies a certain openness to developments outside the United States. Hence the press review can be expected to paint a more prointernational picture of the US position than one may encounter during a representative survey in the country.
138. One possible explanation for the highmeasures of support would be that the more internationally oriented newspapers were more inclined to report the decision by the ICJ, whereas to many provincial papers the Avena judgment was no noteworthy piece of news.
139. ‘Foreigners on Death Row’, New York Times, 19 April 2004.
140. ‘What Goes Around’, Baltimore Sun, 2 April 2004.
141. R. Landauer, ‘Rude Retort to Legal Ruling Dumb, Risky’, Oregonian, 6 April 2004.
142. ‘Irrefutable Evidence’, Texas Observer, 23 April 2004.
143. ‘Supremely Frightening’, Augusta Chronicle, 2 April 2004.
144. ‘Irrefutable Evidence’.
145. W. J. Watkins, ‘Keep U.N. Justice Out of the U.S’, American Spectator, 6 April 2004, available at http//www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=6391.
146. ‘Supremely Frightening’, ‘Irrefutable Evidence’. note 151.
147. ‘Supremely Frightening’.
148. And, one may add, in a letter to the editors by a former president of the International Court of Justice, S. Schwebel, who warned that ‘No country has more at stake in the performance under the treaty than does the US, many thousands of whose citizens travel around the world… If police and courts in the US routinely ignore their obligations under that convention, howcan it be expected thatUS nationalswill enjoy its protection?’ S.M. Schwebel, ‘WhyWeNeed International Court of Justice’, Letter to the editor,Wall Street Journal, 14 April 2004, at A15.
149. Downs and Jones, ‘Supremely Frightening’. note 59.
150. ‘Letter dated 17 October 1986 from the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc. S/18415.
151. Resolution of 28 October 1986, UN Doc. S/18428.However, it should be noted that the resolution itself is not expressly based on Art. 94.
152. Quoted in A. Tanzi, ‘Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations’, (1995) 6 EJIL 539.
153. To prevent such a gridlock of enforcement against veto powers, K. Oellers-Frahm has expressed some sympathy for the position that a decision by the Security Council pursuant to Art. 94(2) of the Charter should not be subject to the ‘veto provision’ of Art. 27(3) of the Charter. H. Mosler and K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 94’, in B. Simma (ed.)., The Charter of the United Nations” A Commentary (2002), para. 13.
154. Neuhold, ‘Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations’ note 51, at 105.
155. Quoted in R. A. Valencia, C. L. Jackson, L. Van de Putte, and R. Ellis, ‘Avena and the World Court's Death Penalty Jurisdiction in Texas” Addressing the Odd Notion of Texas's Independence from theWorld’, (2005) 23 Yale Law and Political Review 455 at 507.
156. ‘US Obliged to Respect International Law’, ‘Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations’ note 146.
157. ‘Supremely Frightening’, ‘US Obliged to Respect International Law’ note 151.
158. Cf. Murray V. Hoboken Land& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (10 How.) 272 (1855). According to Justice Curtis, ‘The words “due process of law”, were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, “by the law of the land”, inMagna Carta’.
159. For a more comprehensive overview of American isolationism see J. Rubenfeld, ‘Unilateralism and Constitutionalism’, (2004) 79 NYU Law Review 1971.
160. G. Washington, Farewell Address (1796), available at http//usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/ 49.htm.
161. T. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (1801), available at http//usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/ 11.htm.
162. In constitutional law scholarship, the predominant interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Constitution is that domestic laws must be enacted strictly pursuant to the Constitution to qualify as the supreme Law of the Land, whereas the requirement that treaties must be ‘made under the Authority of the United States’ refers to a laxer standard. The Bricker Amendment was intended to align the two standards. The amendment is said to have failed largely due to the opposition of President Eisenhower.
163. A. Hamilton, in J. Elliot (ed.), Debates on the Federal Constitution. Vol. 2 (1876), 257. The case of Powell v. McCormack is a particular telling example” while Respondents invoked sixteenth-and seventeenth-century English precedents in support of their position, the Supreme Court pointed out that their leading case for justifying the expulsion of a member of parliament, JohnWilkes, was contrary to American ideals.Wilkes is portrayed as a hero who fought a ‘long and bitter struggle for the right of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice'; the Court notes that the framers themselves ‘tended to identify their cause with that of Wilkes. They saw him as a popular hero and a martyr to the struggle for liberty’. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr, et al. v. JohnW.McCormack et al., 395 U.S. 486 at 528, 531.
164. Cf. the dissents by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, in the cases of Roper v. Simmons, 546 U.S. 551, and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558.
165. R.Weich, ‘Innocence Protection Act” Death Penalty Reform on the Horizon’, ChampionMagazine, April 2001, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
166. Introductory language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-32, 1996.
167. LaGrand, Judgment, Introductory language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 note 126, para. 90; see also Avena, Judgment, Introductory language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 note 1, para. 134.
168. Valencia et al., Introductory language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 note 164, at 457 and 459.
169. M. Kadish, ‘Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations” The International Court of Justice in Mexico v. United States (Avena) Speaks Emphatically to the Supreme Court of the United States about the Fundamental Nature of the Right to Consul’, 36 (2004) Georgetown Journal of International Law 1, at 5.
170. Koh, Introductory language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 note 12, at 2646.
171. J. King, ‘President Tries ToMoot TexasDeath RowCase;Withdraws from Treaty Provision’, Champion, 29May 2005.
172. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘RemarksWithMexican Foreign Secretary ErnestoDerbez’,Mexico City, 10March 2005, available at http//www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43229.htm (emphasis added).
173. The characterization as a ‘new’ norm presupposes a dynamic understanding of international law. From a traditional,positivistperspective,onewouldspeak of anewinterpretation given toanold norm. For purposes of the argument, this theoretical distinction does not yield any different results.
174. While presidential powers with respect to foreign relations are generally interpreted extensively, commentators have suggested that ‘There may be some instances, therefore, in which the federal political branches will lack the authority to override state law, even pursuant to a treaty’. C. A. Bradley and J. L. Goldsmith, ‘The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to US Foreign Relations’, (1998) 92 AJIL 675, n. 18. See more generally the interesting agora on the Breard case, The characterization as a ‘new’ norm presupposes a dynamic understanding of international law., 666.
175. Jogi V. Voges, The characterization as a ‘new’ norm presupposes a dynamic understanding of international law. note 134.
176. Decision by Judge Alden in Dihn Pham, available at http//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/newsanddev.php? scid=31.
177. Guzman, Decision by Judge Alden in Dihn Pham note 17, at 1887.
178. D. G. Savage, ‘Bush Orders New Hearings forMexicans on Death Row’, Contra Costa Times, 9March 2005.
179. The other contributions to the volume, by E. Benvenisti, A.-M. Slaughter, K. W. Abbott, D. Snidal, H. V. Milner, B. P. Rosendorff, E.D.Mansfield, P. C.Mavroidis, and R.Howse, dealwith other issues of international co-operation not directly related to compliance. In order not to lose focus, these remaining chapters could not be discussed in this article. Such omission does not imply any negative judgment as to the scholarly value of these chapters.
180. Less developed countries will find it difficult to establish a positive record of compliance, as multilateral agreements proliferatemore quickly than domestic governance and economies improve. If the reputational cost model is correct, ‘reputation is more an enemy than a friend of these states’, since failure to establish a positive reputation may eventually lead to the exclusion of these states from the benefits of multilateral agreements (Downs and Jones, ‘Reputation, Compliance and Development’, in The Impact of International Law on InternationalCooperation, at 117.)However, the authors also note that the existence ofmultiple reputations will allow developing countries to maintain a positive record in one regulatory area, while losing ground in another. Hence developing countries are unlikely to plunge into the kind of ‘reputational purgatory’ (Such omission does not imply any negative judgment as to the scholarly value of these chapters., at 130) that the classical reputational model would predict.
181. C. Dongxiao, ‘Paradox of American Hegemony and International Institutions’, (2004) 2 Shanghai Institute for International Studies Journal, available at http//www.siis.org.cn/english/journal/2004/2/ Chen%20Dongxiao.htm.