Aumann's and schelling's game theory: The nobel prize in economic science, 2005

Review of Political Economy

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 297-316

  Rizvi, S Abu Turab ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

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EID: 34547550827     PISSN: 09538259     EISSN: 14653982     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09538250701452990     Document Type: Review

References (101)

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