The structural causes of trusting relationships: Why rivals do not overcome suspicion step by step

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 122, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 287-312

  Hoffman, Aaron M ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547154284     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00600.x     Document Type: Review

References (92)

1. See, for example, Shimon Peres and Arye Naor, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt), 11.
2. Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust," Ethics 96 (January 1986): 231-260;
3. James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 91-103;
4. Russell Hardin, "Conceptions and Explanations of Trust" in Karen S. Cook, ed., Trust in Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 3-39;
5. Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), 4-82.
6. Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 9;
7. Aaron M. Hoffman, "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 8 (September 2002): 375-401;
8. Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 70;
9. Bernhardt Lieberman, "i-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three-Person Games and International Affairs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 8 (September 1964): 271-280;
10. David M. Messick and Roderick M. Kramer, "Trust as a Form of Shallow Morality" in Cook, ed., Trust in Society, 89-118.
11. Barber, The Logic, 17.
12. See, for example, Coleman, Foundations, 91.
13. Juan Forero, Marlise Simons, Joseph B. Treaster, and Sam Howe Verhovik, "Kidnapping with Money as the Only Object," The New York Times, 30 June 2001.
14. Data drawn from the United Nations website, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ co_mission/unefii.htm, accessed 17 June 2004.
15. When incompatible interests drive conflicts, trust is irrelevant, because actors lack incentives to resolve their differences cooperatively.
16. Roger Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict" in Roger Fisher, ed., International Conflict and Behavioral Science (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), 91-109;
17. Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 371-400);
18. Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation," International Organization 54 (Spring 2000): 325-358;
19. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 45;
20. Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 85-183.
21. Schelling, The Strategy.
22. Osgood, An Alternative, 8.
23. Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict"; Schelling, The Strategy.
24. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" International Organization 50 (Summer 1996): 379-406.
25. See, for example, George A. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (August 1970): 488-500;
26. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 65-109.
27. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43 (April 1991): 336-366,
28. and Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization 52 (Autumn 1998): 729-758, for discussions of the problems that plague international cooperation.
29. Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Masstricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996): 261-305;
30. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 50-79.
31. This is not to say that actors with effective voice will always be able to influence group decisions. Rather, actors with effective voice can expect their influence to be felt often, and not just on non-essential decisions.
32. Zeev Maoz and Dan S. Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation," International Studies Quarterly 31 (June 1987): 177-200;
33. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 357-369.
34. Although it is relatively rare for independent states to create supranational armies, such steps are not unheard of in world history. The decision by the American states to create a federal army in 1789, before their union was consolidated, is probably the best-known example.
35. Because trusting relationships combine actions with attitudes, actors can trust one another without producing trusting relationships.
36. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 314-378;
37. Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993): 1-39.
38. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
39. Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 228.
40. Moravcsik, The Choice, 376.
41. For text, see Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Belgium: United Nations Publications, 1958).
42. Moravcsik, The Choice, 86-158.
43. Martin Westlake, The Council of the European Union (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), 19-21.
44. Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 533-560.
45. Miriam Camps, European Unification in the Sixties (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 30-40;
46. John Lambert, "The Constitutional Crisis 1955-56," Journal of Common Market Studies 4 (May 1966): 195-228.
47. N. Piers Ludlow, "Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966," Contemporary European History 8 (July 1999): 231-248.
48. Ludlow, "Challenging French Leadership," 247-248.
49. Lambert, "The Constitutional Crisis," 210-212.
50. Moravcsik, The Choice, 194.
51. Westlake, The Council, 18.
52. Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council: Decision-Making in European Politics (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd, 1987), 28;
53. Jan Werts, The European Council (New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., 1992), 20-22;
54. Westlake, The Council, 19-21.
55. Bulmer and Wessels, The European Council.
56. Ibid.
57. Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, Christian Lequesne, and Pedro Mayor Lopez, "The Permanent Representation of the Member States to the European Communities," Journal of Common Market Studies 28 (December 1989): 119-137.
58. B. Guy Peters, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Community" in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), 75-122.
59. Hayes-Renshaw, Lequesne, and Lopez, "The Permanent Representation," 132-133; Westlake, The Council, 290-296.
60. Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, "Executive Power in the European Union: The Functions and Limits of the Council of Ministers," Journal of European Public Policy 2 (December 1995): 559-582.
61. Peters, "Bureaucratic Politics," 81;
62. Mark A. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," International Organization 51 (Winter 1997): 99-134.
63. Peter Ludlow, "The European Commission" in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 85-132.
64. Andrew MacMullen, "European Commissioners 1952-1995: National Routes to a European Elite" in Neill Nugent, ed., At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 27-48.
65. Martin Donnelly and Ella Ritchie, "The College of Commissioners and their Cabinets" in Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, eds., The European Commission (Essex, UK: Longman Group Ltd, 1994), 31-61.
66. Desmond Dinan, An Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 304.
67. John Newhouse, Collision in Brussels: The Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), 54.
68. Camps, European Unification, 30.
69. Quoted in Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), 257.
70. Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1995), 115.
71. Interview with a Belgian representative, 8 January 2003. A Dutch representative I interviewed (10 January 2003) could not recall if questions about compliance influenced Dutch deliberations during the SEA negotiations.
72. Jonas Tallberg, "Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union," International Organization 56 (August 2002): 609-644.
73. Ibid., 625.
74. Ibid.
75. On rare occasions, when the Council made decisions without a Commission proposal, twelve votes cast by at least four member states constituted a qualified majority.
76. Madeline O. Hosli, "Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers," International Organization 47 (Autumn 1993): 629-643.
77. Interview with a Dutch representative, 10 January 2003.
78. Interview with a Belgian representative, 8 January 2003.
79. Quoted in Bulmer and Wessels, The European Council, 147, (italics mine).
80. Joseph H.H. Weiler, "The European Community in Change: Exit, Voice and Loyalty," Irish Studies in International Affairs 3 (1990): 15-25.
81. See Aaron M. Hoffman, Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
82. David C. Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 7;
83. Peter S. Onuf, "Anarchy and the Crisis of Union" in Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert, eds., To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), 272-302.
84. See, for example, George Reed's letter to John Dickinson in Orin Grant Libby, "The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on the Federal Constitution, 1787 - 8," Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series 1 (1897): 1-117.
85. The authoritative accounts of the Convention are found in Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vols, i-iv (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
86. For a history of the Israeli-Jordanian water relationship, see Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
87. Adam Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 9;
88. Moshe Zak, "Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations," Washington Quarterly 8 (Winter 1985): 167-176.
89. David H. Barlow and Michel Herson, Single Case Experimental Designs: Strategies for Studying Behavior Change (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 326-367.
90. Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), ix.
91. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
92. Osgood, An Alternative, 85-134.