Information and endogenous first mover advantages in the ultimatum game: An evolutionary approach

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 129-143

  Poulsen, Anders Udo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Commitment; Evolutionary stability; First mover advantage; Information; Replicator Dynamic; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447558675     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.013     Document Type: Article

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