Bringing the courts back in: Interbranch perspectives on the role of courts in American politics and policy making

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 10, Issue , 2007, Pages 25-43

  Barnes, Jeb ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Law; Microinstitutional analysis; Regime politics; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 34347325057     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.080505.101210     Document Type: Article

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