Why democracies make superior counterterrorists

Security Studies

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 223-253

  Abrahms, Max ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250723810     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410701399424     Document Type: Article

References (176)

1. Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 18.
2. See Leonard B. Weinberg and William L. Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy within One Country: The Case of Italy," Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 98-108
3. Leonard B. Weinberg and William L. Eubank, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 417-43
4. Leonard B. Weinberg and William L. Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no.1 (Spring 1998): 108-18
5. William L. Eubank and Leonard B. Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no.1 (Spring 2001): 155-64
6. Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 249
7. Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (April 2005): 278
8. Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (August 1993): 321
9. Christopher Hewitt, "The Political Context of Terrorism in America: Ignoring Extremists or Pandering to Them?" in The Democratic Experience and Political Violence, ed. David C. Rapoport and Leonard B. Weinberg (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 325-44
10. Brian Michael Jenkins, Fighting Terrorism: An Enduring Task (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1981), 4.
11. See Weinberg and Eubank, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" 417-43
12. Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 7-8
13. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 44-45
14. Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 59-62
15. Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 31
16. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22, 24, 46-47
17. Richard A. Clarke, Rand Beers, et al., The Forgotten Homeland: A Century Foundation Task Force Report (Washington, DC: Century Foundation Press, 2006), 8
18. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" 278.
19. Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 14-15
20. Peter Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 35
21. Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 18.
22. See Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 80.
23. See Bruce Hoffman, "Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?" Foreign Policy (Summer 1995): 65.
24. See Eubank andWeinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," 155-64
25. Weinberg and Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," 108-18
26. Li and Schaub, "Economic Globalization," 249.
27. See Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 7-8
28. Pape, Dying to Win, 44-45.
29. National Counterterrorism Center, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System "Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC's Database of Terrorist Incidents," http://wits.nctc.gov/Methodology.do.
30. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, "Frequently Asked Questions," MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/NCTC/Faqs.jsp (accessed 8 February 2006).
31. See Robert Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006)
32. Richard Ashby Wilson, ed., Human Rights in the War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
33. Timothy J. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005).
34. Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," 155-64
35. Weinberg and Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," 108-18
36. Li and Schaub, "Economic Globalization," 249.
37. Weinberg and Eubank, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" 417-43.
38. Todd Sandler, "On the Relationship between Democracy and Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 2.
39. See Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims"
40. Weinberg and Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose"
41. Li and Schaub, "Economic Globalization," 249.
42. See Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism," 321v22
43. Li and Schaub, "Economic Globalization," 242
44. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" 278.
45. Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism," 321.
46. My appreciation to Erica Chenoweth for this insight. 19 Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism,"
47. See also Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 8, 172.
48. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, "Iraqi Democratic Front," MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, at http://www.tkb.org.
49. "There Are Limits to Intelligence But Not to Stupidity," Arab News 12 August 2006, http://www.arabnews.com/?page= 7§ion=0&article=79110&d=12&m=8&y=2006.
50. Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism," 325.
51. Laqueur, Terrorism, 224. Pape makes the related argument that democracies encourage terrorism because they are at least "thought to be especially vulnerable to coercive punishment." Pape, Dying to Win, 44.
52. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22, 24, 46-47
53. see also Pape, Dying to Win, 44-45
54. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 7-8
55. Laqueur, Terrorism, 221.
56. Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 22, 46-47.
57. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?," 283.
58. U. Zahler, "Political Developments in Iraq 1963v1980," in Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction, ed. CARDRI (London: Zed Books, 1989), 63.
59. See Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism," 35
60. Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," 14-15
61. Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 18
62. Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism," 322, 325
63. Pape, Dying to Win, 44v45. For a quality book on how democracies must balance operational effectiveness and liberal democratic acceptability, see Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem, Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror (Cambridge, MA: BCSIA, 2005). There is widespread agreement that norms constrain democracies more than other regime types. It should be added, however, that democracies are less restricted by normative constraints when their counterterrorism campaigns take place outside their own countries than when the locus of counterterrorist activity is directed against their own electorate. My appreciation to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
64. Weinberg and Eubank, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" 420
65. Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 22, 46v47
66. Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 59v62
67. Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 31
68. Clarke, Beers, et. al., Forgotten Homeland, 8
69. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents," 283.
70. ITERATE does contain events data for domestic campaigns when "its ramifications transcend national boundaries." It excludes, however, the vast majority of domestic terrorist incidents, such as attacks from the Irish Republican Army, Tamil Tigers, Basque Nation and Liberty, and Italian leftist groups.
71. Edward F. Mickolus, "How Do We Know We're Winning the War Against Terrorists? Issues in Measurement," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 3 (May-June 2002): 152.
72. Ted Robert Gurr, "Empirical Research on Political Terrorism," in Current Perspectives on International Terrorism, ed. Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 122, 128, 145.
73. Schmid also makes this point in Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 174.
74. Paul Wilkinson, "The Strategic Implications of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Political Violence, ed. M.L. Sondhi (New Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research and Har-anand Publications, 2000), 21.
75. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006),
76. See also Jan Oskar Engene, Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends since 1950 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), 60-62, 168.
77. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base http://www.tkb.org (accessed 3 March 2006).
78. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 7-8
79. Pape, Dying to Win, 44v45.
80. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (accessed 3 March 2006).
81. Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism," 327
82. Gurr, "Empirical Research on Political Terrorism," 131
83. Wilkinson, "The Strategic Implications of Terrorism," 21.
84. See Hoffman, "The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism" (paper, International Conference on Aviation Safety and Security in the 21st Century for the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Washington, D.C., 13-15 January 1997).
85. U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Office, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Office of Counterterrorism, 2005, www.state.gov.
86. See, for example, Weinberg and Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," 108-18
87. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" 278
88. Gause, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?"
89. Alan B. Krueger and David Laitin, "Kto Kogo: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism," Sage Foundation Mimeo (November 2003).
90. The frequency distribution of regime types was 49 (26 percent), 53 (28 percent), and 88 (46 percent) for Not Free, Partially Free, and Free countries, respectively. All testing was based on determining statistical significance at a two-sided alpha level of 0.05.
91. Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 2nd ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erbaum, 1988).
92. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The 2004 Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 715. 44 National Counterterrorism Center, "Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC's Database of Terrorist Incidents," MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/NCTCMethodology.jsp (accessed 3 February 2006).
93. Laqueur, Terrorism, 166.
94. See Engene, Terrorism in Western Europe, 52
95. Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators: Third Edition, 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983),181
96. Weinberg and Eubank, "Does Terrorism Encourage Democracy?" 417-18
97. Taylor and Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators 179
98. National Counterterrorism Center, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, http://wits.nctc.gov/Methodology.do
99. Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," Terrorism and Political Violence 5, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 213-51
100. Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 379
101. Crenshaw, "How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism" in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. L. Howard (London: Praeger, 1992), 71-93.
102. Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas Gofas, "The Devil You Know but Are Afraid to Face: Underreporting Bias and Its Distorting Effects on the Study of Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50, no. 5 (October 2006): 734.
103. See Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 56-57.
104. Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 5
105. Gurr, "Empirical Research on Political Terrorism," 125.
106. See Weinberg and Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy within One Country," 98-108
107. Weinberg and Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," 108-18
108. Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," 155-64
109. Li and Schaub, "Economic Globalization," 249.
110. Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 42-78.
111. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 6-13
112. Dying to Win, 61, 64-65.
113. See Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 49.
114. Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002)
115. See also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
116. Max Abrahms, "Dying to Win," Middle East Policy 12, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 176-78.
117. The liberal countries have a civil liberty score of two or lower, while the illiberal countries have a score of five or higher according to Freedom House. WITS was used to select the target countries because of its superior events data coverage; it was not used to establish the peak years of attack because it covers a small period of time relative to the other datasets used in the study and employs a slightly different methodology. No country's regime type classification moved from Free to Not Free.
118. Edward Mickolus, Todd M. Sandler, Jean M. Murdock, International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events, vol. 1, 1980-83 (Ames: Iowa State University Press), xi. See also MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, "Frequently Asked Questions." Differences between RAND definitions and coding of terrorism with those employed by other major terrorism datasets are described as "minor."
119. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, "Groups Sub-Categories," MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Category.jsp?catID=1
120. Federation of American Scientists, "Liberation Movements, Terrorist Organizations, Substance Cartels, and Other Para-State Entities," http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/.
121. Tables 2 and 3 reveal that the peak years of attack on the illiberal countries are more recent than the peak years of attack on the liberal countries. One might speculate that the variance in coercion rates between the two regime types simply reflects the fact that terrorism has become more policy effective within the past decade. This hypothesis is unfounded as even recent campaigns against liberal countries have been largely ineffective. The peak years of the illiberal countries are relatively recent for a more prosaic reason: Incomplete data. Terrorism against illiberal countries has tended to be domestic, and for non-European countries, domestic events data coverage begins in 1998. That terrorism against illiberal countries has tended to be domestic does not mean that terrorism against liberal countries has tended to be international. For most of the world's liberal countries, terrorist activity-measured in terms of either the number of incidents or fatalities-has been domestic. See Engene, Terrorism in Western Europe.
122. See Marvin Ott, "Mediation As a Method of Conflict Resolution, Two Cases," International Organization 26, no. 4 (Autumn 1972): 613.
123. See also John A. Vasquez, "The Tangibility of Issues and Global Conflict: A Test of Rosenau's Issue Area Typology," Journal of Peace Research 20, no. 2 (Summer 1983): 179.
124. This observation is consistent with Bruce Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," International Studies Quarterly 36, no.1 (March 1992): 49-74. In this pioneering study, Jentleson shows that democracies are considerably more likely to support military actions to resist campaigns directed against their own country than to remake foreign countries.
125. William Odom correctly observes that terrorists "have never brought down a liberal democracy." See David McHugh, "Bin Laden Tape Urges Stopping Oil to U.S.," Associated Press, 18 December 2004. There are, however, two partial exceptions. In the early 1970s the democratically elected Uruguayan government tried to stamp out the Tupamaros by temporarily suspending civil liberties. More recently, Prime Minister José Maria Aznar's Popular Party was replaced by the Socialists following the 11 March 2004 Madrid train attacks. Some observers perceived the election outcome as a successful protest against maintaining Spanish troops in Iraq. In fact, Aznar's defeat was influenced more by the public's disgust over his transparent attempt to blame Basque terrorists for the attacks.
126. As Philip H. Gordon testified before Congress, "The government appears to have paid more of a price for misleading the public than for its,policy on Iraq." Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 March 2004.
127. David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism," in Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (London: Routledge 1992), 1192
128. Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War: Ideology, Rage, and the Assault on America," in How Did this Happen: Terrorism and the New War, ed. James F. Hoge Jr. and Gideon Rose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001),32.
129. David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," Foreign Affairs 53, no. 4 (July 1975): 687.
130. John Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 491.
131. Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."
132. Ibid. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 17-18.
133. James Denardo, Power In Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 188, 209.
134. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, "Group Profile: Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M)," MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3531.
135. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategic Plan for theWar on Terrorism, report prepared for U.S. Department of Defense, 1 February 2006, 18, 20.
136. David A. Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century," Dialogue-IO, Spring 2002, 24.
137. David A. Lake, "Rational Extremism" 24, 20-21.
138. Laqueur, Terrorism, 303.
139. Michael Howard, "Terrorism Has Always Fed Off Its Response," The Times, 14 September 2001.
140. Juan Cole, "Did Saddam Gas the Kurds?" History News Network, 4 February 2003, http://hnn.us/articles/1242.html.
141. See Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 8.
142. Meron, How Democracies Lose Small Wars,
143. See also Christopher Harrison, "French Attitudes to Empire and the Algerian War," African Affairs 82, no. 326 (January 1983): 75.
144. Christopher Harrison, "French Attitudes to Empire and the Algerian War," African Affairs 82, no. 326 (January 1983): 75.
145. Martin Harrison, "Government and Press in France during the Algerian War," American Political Science Review 58, no. 2 (June 1964): 278
146. Thomas Martin, "The British Government and the End of French Algeria, 1958-1962," Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no.2 (June 2002): 173.
147. Albert Camus, quoted in Chester W. Obuchowski, "Algeria: The Tortured Conscience," The French Review 42, no. 1 (October 1968): 97.
148. John Talbott, "French Public Opinion and the Algerian War: A Research Note," French Historical Studies 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1975): 358.
149. David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1963), 7, 104.
150. Bruce Hoffman, "A Nasty Business," Atlantic Monthly, January 2002, 3.
151. Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, "France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy," Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 2 (June 2002): 18.
152. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1157, 1162
153. Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 130.
154. Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 235-69.
155. Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions About Terrorism," 486, 488.
156. Roper Poll, USYANKP.021097, R15Bl, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 5-6 February 1997 (Storrs, CT: The Roper Center, University of Connecticut, 10 February 1997)
157. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion and scfi U.S. Foreign Policy: 1987, polls 6 and 15, October-November 1986 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 1986), http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/ American%20Public%20Opinion%20Report%201987.pdf (accessed 5 March 2006)
158. Los Angeles Times Poll/EOS Gallup Europe, 080896, R3, 3-6 August 1996
159. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "A World Transformed: Foreign Policy Attitudes of the U.S. Public After September 11," Worldviews 2002 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2002, http://www.worldviews.org/key_findings/us_911_report.htm#kf1. See also EOS Gallup Europe, USMISC.04Trans, R26G, 6-26 June 2004 (released 9 September 2004)
160. Roper Poll, RO25l, USGREEN.01GLOBE, 4-6 December 2001 (released 11 December 2001)
161. Roper Poll, USHARRIS.02CCFRA, R0315, 1-30 June 2002 (released 2 October 2002)
162. Princeton Poll, 003, 4-11 September 1997 (Princeton: Princeton Research Associates International, 10 October 1997).
163. Russett, Controlling the Sword, 37.
164. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," 49-73.
165. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion: 1987.
166. Fox News Poll, USODFOX.113001, R09, 28 November 2001 (New York: Fox News Network, 30 November 2001).
167. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, USABCWP.031505, R23, 10-13 March 2005 (New York: ABC News, 15 March 2005).
168. Pew Poll, USPSRA.101002, R48F2, 2-6 October 2002 (Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 10 October 2002).
169. Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says U.S. Has 'Bulletproof' Evidence of Iraq's Links to Al Qaeda," New York Times, 28 September 2002
170. Princeton Poll, USPSRA.092804, RO5D, 22-26 September 2004 (released 28 September 2004); Fox News Poll, USODFOX.092702, R12, 24-25 September 2002 (released 27 September 2002).
171. Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 7-46.
172. See also Chaim Kaufman, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security 29, no. 1 (summer 2004), 30-41.
173. Lake, "Rational Extremism," 26.
174. George W. Bush, quoted in Natan Sharansky, The Case for Democracy: the Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 22
175. Condoleeza Rice, "The Promise of Democratic Peace," Washington Post, 11 December 2005.
176. F. Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005), 64.