The effects of proxy bidding and minimum bid increments within eBay auctions

ACM Transactions on the Web

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2007, Pages

  Rogers, Alex ^a   David, Esther ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^a   Schiff, Jeremy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Bid increment; Electronic commerce; Online auctions; Proxy bidding; Sniping

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION;

BID INCREMENT; ONLINE AUCTIONS; PROXY BIDDING;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 34250204457     PISSN: 15591131     EISSN: 1559114X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1255438.1255441     Document Type: Article

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