Influence of firm performance and gender on CEO compensation

Applied Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 9, 2007, Pages 1107-1113

  Mohan, Nancy ^a   Ruggiero, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BENCHMARKING; COMPENSATION; GENDER ISSUE; MEASUREMENT METHOD; WAGE GAP; WOMENS STATUS;

EID: 34249736933     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: 14664283     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00036840500474264     Document Type: Article

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