A global game with strategic substitutes and complements

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 155-175

  Karp, Larry ^a   Lee, In Ho ^b   Mason, Robin ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Seoul National University   (South Korea)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Congestion; Coordination; Global games

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249060378     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.003     Document Type: Article

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