Simple sentences, substitutions, and mistaken evaluations

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 111, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-41

  Braun, David ^a   Saul, Jennifer ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248743811     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021287328280     Document Type: Review

References (39)

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