Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 108, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 65-81

  Braun, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847632623     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1015760114297     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Braun, David (1998): 'Understanding Belief Reports', Philosophical Review 107, 555-595.
2. Kaplan, David (1989): 'Demonstratives', in Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan (pp. 481-564), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. McKay, Thomas (1979): 'On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions', Philosophical Studies 39, 287-303.
4. Perry, John (1979): 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', Noûs 13, 3-21.
5. Salmon, Nathan (1986): Frege's Puzzle, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6. Salmon, Nathan (1989): 'Illogical Belief', Philosophical Perspectives 3, 243-285.
7. Saul, Jennifer (1998): 'The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription', Philosophical Studies 92, 636-389.
8. Soames, Scott (1988): 'Direct Reference, Prepositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content', in Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes (pp. 197-239), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Soames, Scott (2002): Beyond Rigidity: the Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Thau, Michael (2002): Cognition and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.