Multidimensional private value auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 126, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-30

  Fang, Hanming ^a   Morris, Stephen ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Allocative efficiency; Information acquisition; Multidimensional auctions; Revenue equivalence

Indexed keywords

EID: 30444450400     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.002     Document Type: Article

References (38)

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