Optimal vs. traditional securities under moral hazard

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 161-189

  Robe, Michel A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039444452     PISSN: 00221090     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2676277     Document Type: Article

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