Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study

Experimental Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 143-167

  Healy, Paul J ^a   Ledyard, John O ^b   Noussair, Charles ^c   Thronson, Harley ^d   Ulrich, Peter ^d   Varsi, Giulio ^d  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NASA HEADQUARTERS   (United States)

Author keywords

Cost sharing; Mechanism design; Moral hazard; NASA

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248180178     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9137-x     Document Type: Article

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