The allocation of a shared resource within an organization

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 163-192

  Ledyard, John O ^a   Noussair, Charles ^b   Porter, David ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Mechanism design; Scheduling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040279000     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf02499132     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Banks, J., J. Ledyard and D. Porter, 1989, Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach, RAND Journal of Economics 20, 1-25.
2. Bykowsky, M., R. Cull and J. Ledyard, 1995, Mutually destructive bidding: The FCC auction design problem. Social science working paper no. 916 (California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA)
3. Calsamiglia, X., 1977, Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns, Journal of Economic Theory 14, 263-283.
4. Grether, D., R.M. Isaac and C. Plott, 1981, The allocation of landing rights by unanimity among competitors, American Economic Review, Proceedings, 71, 166-171.
5. Hurwicz, L., 1994, Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions, Economic Design 1, 1-14.
6. Jordan, J., 1987, The informational requirements of local stability in decentralized allocation mechanisms, In: T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, eds.. Information, incentives and economic mechanisms (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN) Ch. 5.
7. Koopmans, T. and M. Beckman, 1957, Assignment problems and the location of economic activities, Econometrica 25, 53-76.
8. Ledyard, J., 1993, The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing, Journal of Organizational Computing 3, 121-134.
9. Ledyard, J., 1995, Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In: A. Roth and J. Kagel, eds., Handbook of experimental economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).
10. Ledyard, J., C. Noussair and D. Porter, 1994, The allocation of a shared resource within an organization, Working paper 1063 (Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN).
11. Olson, M., 1991, Dominant and Nash strategy mechanisms for the assignment problem. Social science working paper no. 770 (California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA).
12. Olson, M. and D. Porter, 1991, A deep space resource allocation primer, Mimeo. (California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA).
13. Olson, M. and D. Porter, 1994, An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money, Economic Theory 4, 11-40.
14. Papai, S., 1994, Assignment by design, Mimeo. (California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA).
15. Riker, W. and I. Sened, 1991, A political theory of the origin of property rights: Airport slots. American Journal of Political Science 35, 951-969.
16. Saari, D. and C. Simon, 1978, Effective price mechanisms, Econometrica 46, 1097-1125.
17. Smith, V., 1976, Experimental economics: Induced value theory, American Economic Review 66, 274-279.