Takeover auctions with actively participating targets

Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 293-311

  Khoroshilov, Yuri ^a   Dodonova, Anna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Auction; Takeover

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247474486     PISSN: 10629769     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2006.11.002     Document Type: Article

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