Determining damages from the operation of bidding rings: An analysis of the post-auction 'knockout' sale

Economic Theory

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 243-269

  Deltas, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Assessment of damages; Cartels; Collusion; Takeovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036488440     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004213     Document Type: Article

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