The core of social choice problems with monotone preferences and a feasibility constraint

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 467-478

  Meirowitz, Adam ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2442717608     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0227-9     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Arrow K (1951) Social choice and individual values. Yale University Press, New Haven
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3. Bredon G (1993) Topology and geometry. Springer. Berlin Heidelberg New York
4. Banks J (1995) Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model. J Math Econ 24: 523-536
5. McKelvey R, Schofield N (1986) Structural instability of the core. J Math Econ 15: 179-198
6. McKelvey R, Schofield N (1987) Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point. Econometrica 55: 923-934
7. Plott C (1967) A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. Am Econ Rev 57: 787-806
8. Saari D (1997) The generic existence of a core for q-rules. Econ Theory 9: 219-260
9. Zaller J (1998) Coming to grips with V.O. Key's concept of latent opinion. U.C.L.A. typescript