Forming efficient agent groups for completing complex tasks

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 834-841

  Manisterski, Efrat ^a   David, Esther ^b   Kraus, Sarit ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Complex task allocation; Efficient allocation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

COMPLEX TASK ALLOCATION; COOPERATIVE AGENT SYSTEMS; EFFICIENT ALLOCATION; TASK ALLOCATION PROBLEM;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 34247269173     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160784     Document Type: Conference Paper

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