Corporate influence and the regulatory mandate

Journal of Politics

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 300-319

  Gordon, Sanford C ^a   Hafer, Catherine ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247142291     PISSN: 00223816     EISSN: 14682508     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00533.x     Document Type: Review

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