Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 134, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 155-174

  Sotomayor, Marilda ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Competitive equilibrium; Core; Lattice; Matching; Setwise stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247138045     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005     Document Type: Article

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