Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 261-265

  Sotomayor, Marilda ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Assignment game; optimal matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141537219     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00067-2     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Demange, G., 1982. Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. Mimeo, Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'École Polytechnique, Paris.
2. Demange G. Gale D. The strategic structure of two-sided matching markets Econometrica 55 1985 873-888
3. Leonard H.B. Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions Journal of Political Economy 91 1983 461-479
4. Roth A. Sotomayor M. Two-sided Matching. A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econonometric Society Monographs no. 18 1990 Cambridge University Press
5. Shapley L.S. Shubik M. The assignment game I: the core International Journal of Game Theory 1 1972 111-130
6. Sotomayor, M., 2003. Buying and selling strategies in the Assigment Game. Mimeo.