Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

Discrete Mathematics

Volumn 217, Issue 1-3, 2000, Pages 135-156

  Eriksson, Kimmo ^a   Karlander, Johan ^a  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Core; Lattice; Matching; Optimal matching; Stable matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347016864     PISSN: 0012365X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0012-365X(99)00260-5     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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