CEO stock option pay and R&D spending: a behavioral agency explanation

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 60, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 482-492

  Wu, Jianfeng ^a   Tu, Rungting ^a  

^a Peking University   (China)

Author keywords

Behavioral agency theory; CEO stock option pay; R D spending

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947727380     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.12.006     Document Type: Article

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