To martyr or not to martyr: Jihad is the question, what policy is the answer?

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 30, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 429-443

  Dutter, Lee E ^a   Seliktar, Ofira ^b  

^a BARRY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947714954     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100701258601     Document Type: Article

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