Constraints, Compromises, and Decision Making

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 14-37

  Goertz, Gary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral decision theory; International norms; Noncompensatory decision making; Poliheuristic theory; Rules of war; Spatial modeling; Utility functions

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642578130     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703260273     Document Type: Review

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