-
1
-
-
85050169450
-
Do parties make a difference? Parties and the size of government in liberal democracies
-
Blais, André, Donald Blake, and Stephane Dion. 1993. Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 37:40-62.
-
(1993)
American Journal of Political Science
, vol.37
, pp. 40-62
-
-
Blais, A.1
Blake, D.2
Dion, S.3
-
2
-
-
0034837264
-
The fiscal manipulation of a decentralized public sector: Macroeconomic policy in Denmark
-
Blom-Hansen, Jens, and Thomas Pallesen. 2001. The Fiscal Manipulation of a Decentralized Public Sector: Macroeconomic Policy in Denmark. Government and Policy 19:607-623.
-
(2001)
Government and Policy
, vol.19
, pp. 607-623
-
-
Blom-Hansen, J.1
Pallesen, T.2
-
4
-
-
84971915349
-
Growth by exception: Or the vain attempt to impose resource scarcity on the danish public sector
-
Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegaard. 1982. Growth by Exception: Or the Vain Attempt to Impose Resource Scarcity on the Danish Public Sector. Journal of Public Policy 2:117-144.
-
(1982)
Journal of Public Policy
, vol.2
, pp. 117-144
-
-
Christensen, J.G.1
-
5
-
-
0039765495
-
The dynamics of decentralization and Recentralization
-
_. 2000. The Dynamics of Decentralization and Recentralization. Public Administration 78:389-408.
-
(2000)
Public Administration
, vol.78
, pp. 389-408
-
-
-
6
-
-
0035532606
-
Institutions, distributional Concerns, and public sector reform
-
Christensen, Jørgen Grannegaard, and Thomas Pallesen. 2001. Institutions, Distributional Concerns, and Public Sector Reform. European Journal of Political Research 39:179-202.
-
(2001)
European Journal of Political Research
, vol.39
, pp. 179-202
-
-
Christensen, J.G.1
Pallesen, T.2
-
7
-
-
0012067390
-
-
Aarhus, Denmark: Department of Economics, University of Aarhus
-
Christoffersen, Henrik, and Martin Paldam. 1998. Markets and Municipalities. Aarhus, Denmark: Department of Economics, University of Aarhus.
-
(1998)
Markets and Municipalities
-
-
Christoffersen, H.1
Paldam, M.2
-
8
-
-
0031412242
-
Contracting out by the public sector: Theory, evidence, prospects
-
Domberger, Simon, and Paul Jensen. 1997. Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, Evidence, Prospects. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13:67-78.
-
(1997)
Oxford Review of Economic Policy
, vol.13
, pp. 67-78
-
-
Domberger, S.1
Jensen, P.2
-
9
-
-
0001300201
-
How markets for impure public goods organize: The case of household refuse collection
-
Dubin, J., and P. Navarro. 1988. How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 4:217-241.
-
(1988)
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
, vol.4
, pp. 217-241
-
-
Dubin, J.1
Navarro, P.2
-
12
-
-
84975994556
-
The political underpinnings of privatization
-
Feigenbaum, Harvey B., and Jeffrey R. Henig. 1994. The Political Underpinnings of Privatization. World Politics 46:185-208.
-
(1994)
World Politics
, vol.46
, pp. 185-208
-
-
Feigenbaum, H.B.1
Henig, J.R.2
-
14
-
-
84965567325
-
The decision to contract out: An empirical analysis
-
Ferris, James. 1986. The Decision to Contract Out: An Empirical Analysis. Urban Affairs Quarterly 22:289-311.
-
(1986)
Urban Affairs Quarterly
, vol.22
, pp. 289-311
-
-
Ferris, J.1
-
16
-
-
0030439136
-
Cities and privatization: Examining the effect of fiscal stress, location, and wealth in medium-sized cities
-
Greene, Jeffrey D. 1986. Cities and Privatization: Examining the Effect of Fiscal Stress, Location, and Wealth in Medium-Sized Cities. Policy Studies Journal 24:135-144.
-
(1986)
Policy Studies Journal
, vol.24
, pp. 135-144
-
-
Greene, J.D.1
-
18
-
-
0012006828
-
The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons
-
Hart, O., A. Sleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1997. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1127-1161.
-
(1997)
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, vol.112
, pp. 1127-1161
-
-
Hart, O.1
Sleifer, A.2
Vishny, R.W.3
-
25
-
-
0035596449
-
Bureaucratic inefficiency: Failure to capture the efficiencies of outsourcing
-
Robinson, B. Brooks. 2001. Bureaucratic Inefficiency: Failure to Capture the Efficiencies of Outsourcing. Public Choice 107:253-270.
-
(2001)
Public Choice
, vol.107
, pp. 253-270
-
-
Brooks, R.B.1
-
26
-
-
0007330417
-
The variability of party government: A theoretical and empirical critique
-
Rose, Richard. 1969. The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique. Political Studies 27:413-445.
-
(1969)
Political Studies
, vol.27
, pp. 413-445
-
-
Rose, R.1
-
27
-
-
0001971810
-
-
Chatman, U.K.: Chatman House
-
Savas, E. S. 1987. Privatization. Chatman, U.K.: Chatman House.
-
(1987)
Privatization
-
-
Savas, E.S.1
-
28
-
-
0030240845
-
When parties matters: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy
-
Schmidt, Manfred G. 1996. When Parties Matters: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy. European Journal of Public Policy 30:155-183.
-
(1996)
European Journal of Public Policy
, vol.30
, pp. 155-183
-
-
Schmidt, M.G.1
-
31
-
-
0011738790
-
-
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press
-
Stein, Robert M. 1990. Urban Alternatives. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
-
(1990)
Urban Alternatives
-
-
Stein, R.M.1
-
32
-
-
84934349477
-
Privatization and the British electorate: Microeconomic policies, macroeconomic evaluations, and party support
-
Studlar, Donley T., Ian MacAllister, and Alvaro Ascui. 1990. Privatization and the British Electorate: Microeconomic Policies, Macroeconomic Evaluations, and Party Support. American Journal of Political Science 34:1077-1101.
-
(1990)
American Journal of Political Science
, vol.34
, pp. 1077-1101
-
-
Studlar, D.T.1
MacAllister, I.2
Ascui, A.3
-
33
-
-
34249919271
-
Ownership vs. competition: Efficiency in public enterprise
-
Vinning, Aiden, and Anthony Boardman. 1992. Ownership vs. Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise. Public Choice 73:205-239.
-
(1992)
Public Choice
, vol.73
, pp. 205-239
-
-
Vinning, A.1
Boardman, A.2
|