Price-fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence

Research in Law and Economics

Volumn 22, Issue , 2007, Pages 59-153

  Connor, John M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33846620525     PISSN: 01935895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0193-5895(06)22004-9     Document Type: Review

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