Cheating in online auction - Towards explaining the popularity of English auction

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 53-62

  Jenamani, Mamata ^a   Zhong, Yuhui ^b   Bhargava, Bharat ^b  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (India)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Buyer's expected utility; Cheating; Equilibrium bidding strategy; Online auction; Seller's expected revenue loss

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; INFORMATION RETRIEVAL; TEXT PROCESSING; WEBSITES;

EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING STRATEGY; ONLINE AUCTION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33947404714     PISSN: 15674223     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.elerap.2005.12.002     Document Type: Article

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