Antecedents and effects of free riding in the franchisor-franchisee relationship

Journal of Business Venturing

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 522-544

  Kidwell, Roland E ^a   Nygaard, Arne ^b   Silkoset, Ragnhild ^b  

^a Department of Ecosystem Science and Management   (United States)

^b BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Franchising; Free riding; Social exchange

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947277749     PISSN: 08839026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2006.06.002     Document Type: Article

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