Environmental policy and cooperation beyond the nation state: An introduction and overview

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 99-114

  Muller Furstenberger G ^a   Stephan, G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Coase theorem; Contract enforcement; International environmental agreements; Prisoner's dilemma; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY;

EID: 0031411061     PISSN: 0954349X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0954-349X(96)00068-9     Document Type: Article

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